Jallianwala Bagh, 1919 Page 5
Clearly, as more and more battalions and brigades came into Amritsar and took over the administration of the city, attacks on the people of Amritsar were set to escalate. Baisakhi was further drained of colour as the water supply was cut off by the civil administration. Later it was said that the water supply had been cut because hydrants had been broken by the ‘mob’ on 10 April, and there were rumours that the water was poisoned, ‘so it was shut off by the Municipal Engineer’.41 During discussions over the Indemnity Bill, J.P. Thompson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Punjab, said in response to a question from Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, regarding the cutting off of electricity and water: ‘On the 10th of April two out of the three feeders which gave energy to the city were damaged by the mob around 1 p.m. Later on at 2.30 p.m. the mob entered the power-house and stopped the whole plant. At 7 p.m. the one remaining feeder was started. On 11th the mob prevented a mistri from mending the two damaged feeders. That evening the power was cut off (in) the city altogether by order of the General Officer Commanding, and remained off till the 19th. In regard to the water supply, I mentioned the story that the supply had been poisoned. But the water was turned on again early on the 11th after having been cut off on the evening of the 10th, and it was again cut off later on the 11th and remained off till the 14th. Those were the facts and that is the explanation.’42 However, we know that the city was quiet on the evening of 10 April, and 11 April as well. There were no mobs on 11 April. There were obviously other reasons for depriving people of water and electricity—as Malaviya was to comment sarcastically during the debate, the electricity could not have been poisoned.
People would have found it difficult in these circumstances to not just adhere to cleanliness at home but also perform the rituals associated with the funerals, which were conducted on 11 April. It would have been impossible for them to bathe the corpses, which were the legacy of the events of 10 April. How were the blood-soaked streets and clothes washed? How was the area cleaned up? We can only imagine the plight of those who were without electricity for around ten days and without water supply for more than four days. (Some witnesses claimed this period was actually longer.)
Meanwhile, all third-class bookings at Amritsar railway station were stopped, so that no ‘innocent’ persons coming to Amritsar on Baisakhi were affected. This meant no one could leave. Those residents who returned to Amritsar at this time found a city under seige, with soldiers everywhere, smouldering buildings, and fellow citizens urging them not to stay.
Lala Girdhari Lal, Deputy Chairman of the Punjab Chamber of Commerce and Managing Director of the Amritsar Flour and General Mills Company, reached Amritsar on 11 April 1919 at about 11.30 a.m., but could not find any conveyance, or anyone to help him with his luggage. He recollected: ‘From and on the canal bridge near Amritsar, I saw batches of policemen guarding the railway line. When the train steamed into the station here, the whole place looked like a regular military post, with soldiers and guns scattered all over. No coolie or conveyance of any kind was to be had. Sardar Bikram Singh met me and advised me to either go back where I had come from, or not to enter the city in any case. Being extremely nervous it appeared to me he did not talk to me for long. . .
‘At the footbridge there was a guard of some European soldiers, who would not let anyone enter the city without searching all things thoroughly. Sticks of all kind were taken away from everyone. After a thorough overhauling of all my things I was allowed to proceed further. No one was permitted to go over the carriage bridge. This continued for days, till the 15th April probably. At every step outside the city, one could see nothing but only military or police at short distances with rifles and bayonets. . . The first thing that struck me, immediately on entering the city, was the stoppage of water supply completely. . . Later in the evening, I found the electric connection all over the city proper also cut off. To the best of my memory, the inconvenience also lasted at least up to 18th or 19th April, if not later. While proceeding to the Golden Temple, I saw marks of violence. Telegraph wires were cut, some buildings were burnt.’43
What Lal noticed was a familiar sight in some other cities as well, where the Satyagraha Movement broke into violence, as the news spread that on 9 April Gandhi had been arrested. These disorders were particularly noted in Delhi, Bombay and Ahmedabad, where protestors had joined Gandhi in demonstrating against the Rowlatt Acts. However, it was when Gandhi was stopped from entering Punjab that serious clashes took place in some places, including Ahmedabad and Amritsar.
In comparison to Amritsar, in Ahmedabad the protestors were far more organised (as we will see in a later chapter). Even though this led to the lynching of at least one European, the agitation was swiftly brought under control. Amritsar would stand out from the rest of the country as each day brought new oppression and concerns, with the city completely cut off through severe restrictions. Geographically, most of the residents lived inside the walled city and could be isolated quite easily from the surrounding areas.
It would soon become apparent that much of the cruelty imposed on Amritsar would also be imposed elsewhere in Punjab as the regime under O’Dwyer decided to institute some rather uniquely barbaric ways to deal with the protests against the Rowlatt Acts, and any suspected rebels.
The truth was that there were many reasons for the people of Punjab to be unhappy. Perhaps one of the reasons why they were drawn to the meetings and helped organise the hartals was the hope that there could be a better and less repressive future.
The four years of the First World War had taken away many of their young and able-bodied men, and yet the conscription had not ended. This was one of the most worrying factors in Punjab, which was primarily an agricultural state. With 7.5 per cent of the country’s population, Punjab provided 60 per cent of the troops.
Who would plough the fields, tend to the aged, support the family? Yes, the blandishments of land and money might still be offered but recruitment was now being done forcefully and there were quotas for each tehsil. If young men were not provided for the British fighting machine, there would be heavy fines. These also led to embarrassments and daily humiliations for those who resisted.44
There were other issues as well, such as the forced contributions towards the war loan, heavy taxes and spiralling prices, which meant that Gandhi’s appeal against the Rowlatt Acts had united those hoping for a more democratic setup. As mentioned earlier, a large number of Indian soldiers who had fought for the British—and for liberty in Europe—had come back victorious, to find shockingly repressive measures being enacted at home, especially in Punjab. It is possible that some of these former soldiers might have expressed their own anger through disruption of the railway network and cutting of telegraph lines. Strategies used to break the communication system of the enemy during the World War were being used against the British. It was not a declaration of war but an attempt to bring the country to a halt—a total ‘hartal’—and to force the British to withdraw the Rowlatt Acts. However, these tactics were consciously perceived to be part of a much more sinister design by the British.
How widespread were these attempts at disruption? In the disorders of 1919, according to the Hunter Committee Report, seven Europeans were murdered and around 54 attacks took place on the communications network in Punjab, from 10 April to 21 April—but then nothing further happened till 29 August.45 Though there was arson and disruption of the railways, none of this pointed towards a grand conspiracy. In fact the disorders appear to have been sporadic in nature.
In his letter of 8 April to Kitchin and O’Dwyer, Irving admitted that ample grounds existed for a revolution in Punjab: ‘As regards the local material for revolution, the soil is prepared for discontent by a number of causes. The poor are hit by high prices, the rich by a severe income tax assessment and the Excess Profit Act. Muhammadans are irritated about the fate of Turkey. From one cause or another the people are restless and discontented and ripe for revolution.’46
Ironically, the so-called
‘rebels’ (including Gandhi) were not actually asking for the exit of their colonial masters—just a withdrawal of the Rowlatt Acts. Many who joined the Satyagraha Movement may admittedly not have read them but what they heard at the rallies made them intensely worried. No Vakil, No Dalil, No Appeal!—was how the Acts were described by opponents. If anyone was arrested under the Acts—he or she could be held without recourse to a lawyer or a trial, or even an appeal. (The Acts are discussed in detail in a later chapter.)
Meanwhile, because of the restrictions on travel and the disruption of the communication system, news of the shooting on the unarmed crowd did not travel far beyond Amritsar. The media did not report the confrontation on 10 April at all. It is unlikely that Gandhi or his cohorts knew anything of the situation in Punjab, particularly within the walled city of Amritsar, as it was unfolding.
The residents of Amritsar found themselves in an increasingly perilous, helpless situation. The attitude of their administrative masters had greatly changed by 11 April. ‘The very men towards whom they were in the habit of showing courtesy now repelled them. Lala Dholan Das, a reputed resident of Amritsar was one such man, but when he went at the request of the authorities to see them, he found them in an angry mood.’47 He remembered that ‘All were in (an) excited temper (sic).’
So much so that Seymour (the Magistrate) is reported to have said that for every one European life, one thousand Indians would be sacrificed. Someone suggested bombarding of the town (Amritsar). As aeroplanes had flown overhead in the morning, the news of the proposed bombardment spread rapidly.
Das believed that he had averted the bombardment of Amritsar. He informed the officers that if, in any way, any part of the Golden Temple was touched or damaged, there would be no end of trouble, as the temple was held sacred all over Punjab.48
But the idea persisted.
Mohammad Sadiq, who also met the British authorities on 11 April to arrange for the disposal of the bodies of the murdered Indians, said: ‘The impression I got from the talk I had with them was that, as Europeans had been murdered, their blood could not remain unavenged, and if there be the least resistance or disobedience of any breach of the peace, sufficient amount of force would be used, and if necessary, the city would be bombarded.’49
The threats continued on 11 and 12 April, causing worry and concern. Because of the ‘war-like’ environment, increasing militarisation, the cutting off of the water supply, the talk about bombardment and the reluctance of the civil authorities to give any kind of reassurance, the fear within the walled city spiraled higher, and so did, probably, people’s frustration at being treated like criminals. The increasing number of soldiers on the streets meant that women and children remained indoors and few men ventured out unless there was urgent work. The city would have been deserted due to the ongoing ‘hartal’ and it is likely that food supplies were affected too.
Amritsar was becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of the world.
Dr Balmokand, Sub Assistant Surgeon, recollected a conversation with Smith, the Civil Surgeon, who said ‘that General Dyer was coming and he would bombard the city. He drew diagrams and showed us how the city would be shelled and how it would be razed to the ground in half an hour. I said I lived in the city, and what was to become of me if there was bombardment. He replied that I had better leave the city and live in the hospital if I wanted to save myself.’50
This conversation, which took place before General Dyer came to Amritsar, indicated that there was already a plan to bring him in to take extreme measures. For the British, the death of twenty Indians was not a high enough price, nor were the restrictions that had been placed on the residents of Amritsar. Could there have been, already, a plan discussed with Dyer, which Smith knew about? The question does arise whether Smith had discussed bringing Dyer to Amritsar when he had met O’Dwyer, as mentioned earlier. (Dyer, however, denied any knowledge of plans to bomb Amritsar while giving evidence before the Hunter Committee.)
Oddly, even though the people of Amritsar were being systematically terrorised, and even though there was no further violence, Irving was extremely concerned that British control over the old city had been lost.
More troops went out and picketed the city all around, according to the ironically named ‘Government House War Diaries’. Around 100 troops with rifles went into the city as far as the Kotwali, leaving strong pickets on the side streets. From this point the Kotwali and all its approaches were held by troops.51 This is important to note as the city was being fortified and prepared for another battle. By the morning, Dyer, who was based in Jullundur, had sent 100 British and 200 Indian troops to Amritsar.52 This could have been in preparation for his arrival, later in the day.
The authorities continued to worry that Hindu–Muslim unity remained unshaken.53 ‘The dead were taken from Khair-ud-din’s Mosque out by the Sultanwind Gate; large processions both of Hindus and Mohammadans seem to have followed in the city but not further.’ Near the Sultanwind Gate, on 12 April, there were shouts of ‘Hindu-Mussalman ki jai.’54 At another city (Lahore), Hindus and Muslims were seen drinking from the same water pot. This was shocking enough for the British to report it, and similar reports were coming in from other parts of the country, including Bombay.55
While Kitchin was in Amritsar, he also noted in his report, sent at 11.30 a.m. on 11 April 1919, that: ‘All is quiet outside. Hindus and Mussalmans have combined, the Mussalmans being the more violent.’56
Yet, even before Kitchin went back to Lahore, on 11 April at 10.40 a.m., his wife had already reported that her husband had wired at 9 a.m. to say the situation was calmer and that he hoped to return the same evening to Lahore.57 Similar reports that the area was quiet came in from the Station Master and Kitchin himself, who said that the funeral processions were orderly. However, as mentioned before, he was disappointed with MacDonald. He made sure his disappointment was directly communicated to O’Dwyer. They obviously required someone who could take a hard line.
That would explain why the more pacific MacDonald might not have been in charge by the evening of 11 April. The first indication of this, in a day of rapid developments, was another ominous telegram dated 11 April 1919, which was sent at 9.30 p.m. from the Officer Commanding, Amritsar, to Aviation, Lahore:
Return aeroplane which went back this evening if possible. Send bombs and machine guns by first available train.58
Brigadier General Reginald Edward Harry Dyer CB, who commanded the Jullundur brigade, had arrived in Amritsar by 9 p.m. to take over from MacDonald.
* * *
1. Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of the Indian National Congress, Volume II, pp. 32, 54, statements 19, 5. Referred to as INC Report hereafter.
2. Benjamin Guy Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty To India (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1920), p. 74.
3. Op. cit., p. 77.
4. F.Z. Kitchlew, Freedom Fighter: The Story of Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew (West Sussex: New Horizon, 1979), pp. 18–19.
5. INC Report (Bombay, 1920), p. 44, statement 650.
6. INC Report, p. 44, statement 650.
7. INC Report, p. 46.
8. Op. cit., p. 47.
9. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Volume III, Amritsar (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), pp. 18–19. Referred to as Evidence, Amritsar hereafter.
10. Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, p. 78.
11. Alfred Draper, The Amritsar Massacre: Twilight of the Raj (Ashford Buchan & Enright, 1985), p. 33.
12. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Volume VI (Calcutta, 1920), p. 3; Disorders Inquiry Committee (1919–1920) Report (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1920), p. 28. The latter is referred to as Hunter Committee Report hereafter.
13. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Volume VI (Calcutta, 1920), p. 3; Hunter Committee Report, p. 28.
14. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, V
olume VI (Calcutta, 1920), p. 3; Hunter Committee Report, p. 28.
15. Punjab Govt. Home Military Part B—January 1920—No. 265, quoted in Raja Ram, The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plan (Chandigarh: Punjab University, 2002), p. 70.
16. Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 70.
17. Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government of India to Investigate the Disturbances in the Punjab, etc.: Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920), p. 22. Referred to as Parliamentary Report hereafter.
18. NAI-Home-Pol-Deposit–June 1919–No. 23: Report on the Rioting on 10 April 1919, as quoted in Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 73.
19. Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 73.
20. INC Report, chap. 5, p. 50.
21. Parliamentary Report, p. 23.
22. Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 74.
23. Hunter Committee Report, pp. 38–40.
24. Parliamentary Report. See ‘Map of Amritsar City’ in the appendix of this book.
25. Hunter Committee Report, p. 41.
26. Hunter Committee Report, p. 41.
27. V.N. Datta, New Light on the Punjab Disturbances in 1919 (Simla: Institute of Advanced Study, 1975), p. 376.
28. Datta, New Light, p. 376.
29. INC Report, Volume II, pp. 32, 54, statements 19, 5.
30. Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 79.
31. INC Report, p. 55; Raja Ram, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 80.
32. Parliamentary Report, p. 27.
33. Evidence, Amritsar, p. 158.
34. The Wathen Papers, quoted in Nigel Collet, The Butcher of Amritsar: Brigadier General Reginald Dyer (London: Hambledon & London, 2005), p. 237.