Jallianwala Bagh, 1919 Page 6
35. Datta, New Light, p. 377.
36. Datta, New Light, p. 377.
37. Datta, New Light, p. 378.
38. Hunter Committee Report, p. 41.
39. Datta, New Light, p. 167. Marginal note on proof by the witness.
40. Collett, Butcher of Amritsar, p. 234.
41. Collett, Butcher of Amritsar, p. 234.
42. Pandit Pearay Mohan, An Imaginary Rebellion and How It Was Suppressed (Lahore: Khosla Bros., 1920; Gyan Publishing House, 1999), p. 944. Citations refer to the Gyan edition.
43. INC Report, p. 52, statement 1.
44. Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, pp. 23–4.
45. Parliamentary Report, p. 55.
46. Evidence Taken Before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, Volume VI (Calcutta, 1920), p. 3.
47. INC Report, p. 63.
48. INC Report, pp. 57–8, statement 1.
49. INC Report, p. 58, statement 19.
50. INC Report, p. 58, statement 20.
51. Parliamentary Report, p. 28.
52. Datta, New Light, p. 377.
53. Parliamentary Report, pp. 27–28; others.
54. Parliamentary Report, p. 28; others.
55. Horniman, Amritsar and Our Duty, p. 77–8.
56. Datta, New Light, p. 377.
57. Datta, New Light, p. 375.
58. Datta, New Light, p. 378.
2
A Gift of Fortune
But this unexpected gift of fortune, this unhoped for defiance, this concentration of the rebels in an open space—it gave him an opportunity as he could not have devised. It separated the guilty from the innocent, it placed them where he would have wished them to be—within reach of his sword. The enemy had committed such another mistake as prompted Cromwell to exclaim at Dunbar, ‘The Lord hath delivered them into my hands’.
—The Life of General Dyer by Ian Colvin1
Reginald Dyer was not a very well-known entity when he arrived in Amritsar, though there are indications that a few people, such as Lieutenant Colonel Smith, had heard about him. Before he hit immortality as a mass murderer, he had a fairly humdrum career. He was the son of a brewer and had grown up in Simla, studying at Bishop Cotton School. He was able to speak Hindustani fluently, and this would have definitely helped him in his career, as he could communicate easily with his troops. He was said to have been quite popular with them. However, he came from the ‘tradesman’ class and this was a drawback in the army, which had its own caste system. The highlight of his career so far had been a stint at the Sarhad (at the far end of Baluchistan) where he tried to play at being Lawrence of Arabia and aimed to annex properties for the British, through a series of misadventures. Finally, after practically wrecking the force there, he was recalled. By the time he reached Jullundur, he was in his 50s and quite unwell, but he managed to hide his illnesses as he needed the commission. He suffered from arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries), which is often quoted as one of the reasons for his behaviour at Jallianwala Bagh. There are also accounts of blinding headaches for which the only cure was alcohol, served by his trusted aide, Brigade Major F.C. Briggs. Perhaps he came to Jallianwala Bagh still looking for a moment of glory by which to prove himself to his peers, who had already done far better than him.
But Dyer was not the only ‘Officer Commanding’ sent to Amritsar. When examining the tragic circumstances surrounding the killings at Jallianwala Bagh, there is an underlying sense that the army officers being sent to Amritsar had been given free rein. It is possible that O’Dwyer, sitting miles away in Lahore, was attempting to keep a lid on Amritsar, while attending his own farewell parties and preparing for a glorious departure. The steel frame of the British bureaucracy showed signs of rot as there was little connect between the events unfolding in Amritsar—which was quiet now—and the repressive commands flowing back from Kitchin and O’Dwyer. It is also doubtful whether others further up the ladder like Viceroy Chelmsford, Secretary of State Edwin Montagu, or Prime Minister Lloyd George had all the facts before them.
Whatever the circumstances, the fact is that three commanding officers were simultaneously present in Amritsar on 11 April.
As M.H.L. Morgan was to write in his recollections of the period, The Truth About Amritsar: By An Eyewitness: ‘MacDonald had been less than forty eight hours in Amritsar when I was summoned to the Divisional office. I was shown a letter from Kitchin, the Commissioner, to General Benyon, saying “Major MacDonald has done nothing to quell the rebellion. Please send an officer who is not afraid to act.” General Benyon decided that I was the officer. I was ordered to proceed as soon as possible to Amritsar. . .’2
Morgan was told that ‘Amritsar is in the hands of rebels. It is your duty to get it back.’
Yet there had been no rebellion after the clash on 10 April morning. Only funerals had taken place on 11 April, while rumours flew thick and fast. The city was quiet, if not calm. Where were the rebels?
General Beynon, who had asked Morgan to go, added cautiously while giving his evidence to the Hunter Committee: ‘Owing to the importance of the Command at Amritsar, I deemed it advisable to send a more senior officer, and accordingly Major Morgan, DSO, Commanding 1-124th Baluchis, proceeded to Amritsar on the night of the 11th April to take over command there.’
He added: ‘Arrival of Brigadier General Dyer, CB, at Amritsar. . .General Dyer had however arrived at Amritsar at 21.00 hours and assumed personal command in addition to establishing his Brigade Headquarters there.’
Nowhere does he mention that he had asked General Dyer to come to Amritsar.
In the confusion between the civil administration and the army, it later appeared that Dyer, who had been posted in Jullundur, might have indeed come of his own volition.3 Never one to tolerate ‘insolence’, he had arrived in the city to teach the people of Amritsar a ‘moral lesson’, as he later put it. This would have been entirely in character; he was known to have extended his brief in the past, particularly when he was asked to go to the Afghan border. A few times, he had even used his fists to settle scores—the tough facade hid a quick temper.4
He also had a fairly inflated belief in himself. He had asked to be promoted to General while at the Sarhad and had been given a temporary rank as Brigadier General. Even when he was given command of the 45th Infantry Brigade in Jullundur, it remained a temporary rank. Thus the Army List, May 1919, states his rank as ‘Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) R.E.H Dyer, C.B., Brigade Commander Jullundur Brigade (45th Infantry Brigade).’ Despite all the bluff and bravado, he remained a Colonel till the end.5
He claimed (even though there is no evidence of it in his report of 25 August to the 16th Division) that at around 2 p.m., on 11 April, he had received a telegram from the 16th Division to go to Amritsar and take charge. As there is no trace of the telegram or any summons to him, it is possible that he just decided to go. While giving evidence in Lahore, he added that there was a roundabout way of communication as many of the telegraph and phone lines were down.
Irving had by now given up his authority, and despite the quiet atmosphere, and the funerals being completed peacefully, he still maintained the city was ‘impertinently hostile’. He did not actually enter the walled city after 10 April, and later remarked, ‘it was freely said that it might be the Raj of the Sarkar outside, but inside it was Hindu-Musalmanon ki hakumat.’6
This was not quite correct, as the streets were largely deserted on 11 and 12 April, apart from the funeral processions. But a few people had come out to see the destruction of the buildings. When he was questioned by the Hunter Committee about not going into the city after 10 April, Irving said, ‘Neither cared, nor were allowed by the Military authorities. None of us were such fools as to put our heads into a hornet’s nest.’ Obviously the death of the five Europeans made him imagine others were equally at risk.
Clearly, the civil administration preferred a military occupation. But the question then arose, which was never really answered—was it legal?
O’Dwyer answered ‘yes’. When further pressed if this was legal—or whether the authority was handed over under a specific law, O’Dwyer replied, ‘I do not know of any specific law, but I should think that if the civil authority were powerless and if the military authority alone could cope with the situation, an officer would be failing in his duty if he did not transfer the authority and ask the military to take charge.’ When again asked whether there was a law or rule under which it could be done, he said there was no rule or law under which the commissioner could on his own accord hand over his authority to a military officer. ‘I take it that it was necessary in the emergency: it was an act taken for the benefit of the public. That is the only way I can explain it. I am not a legal authority on constitutional law. Anything that is not expressly prohibited may be taken as allowed.’
Perhaps because there was no clear cut process, and both Kitchin and O’Dwyer were simply trying out various options for a tough executioner, when Major Morgan—who had been ‘officially’ sent by Beynon—arrived in Amritsar, he found that Dyer was already in situ. As the chain of authority had broken down, it was Dyer who asked Morgan to stay on.
In the Hunter Committee Report, O’Dwyer appeared unable to explain exactly how Dyer took charge from Major MacDonald, who was still in command in Amritsar. Meanwhile, Morgan was not even mentioned in the cross-examination.
Q: Then when General Dyer arrived he was handed over charge by Mr Miles Irving. That again complicated the position. The authority had already been handed over to Major MacDonald by Mr Kitchin?
O’Dwyer: Did he say so? I did not know it. Perhaps when the General arrived he wanted some definite authorisation.
Q: That authority had already been absolutely handed over to Major MacDonald?
Still unable to confirm that General Dyer had simply taken over without anyone asking him to do so, O’Dwyer said, ‘I suggest that such authority as had not been transferred still vested in the Deputy Commissioner.’ (Implying that, despite Kitchin having handed over authority to MacDonald, Irving still had some remaining authority which could be handed over to Dyer. It was a peculiar reply.)
Q: Could it be divided? Was there a division of authority?
O’Dwyer: It was only my suggestion. The situation was one that could not be controlled by the civil authority; the military had to take charge to re-establish order.
Q: On the 11th I presume that there was no civil authority. Then Mr Miles Irving hands over the same authority handed over (to Major Macdonald) by Mr Kitchin the previous day to General Dyer.
O’Dwyer, still hunting for an answer for the fact that there was no actual record of the transfer of authority from MacDonald to Dyer, replied:
‘It was perhaps understood that the transfer of authority in the first instance was a temporary one, and now that a new commander had arrived, it was necessary to make a fresh transfer. Perhaps that was in their minds. . .it might have been done to regularise the whole thing, Mr Kitchin probably had not given anything in writing.’
Q: Then again you think that if he thought the situation demanded the handing over of authority to the military authorities, he was justified in doing it?
O’Dwyer: I think he was justified; in fact the situation required it.
Q: But there is no specific instruction about it?
O’Dwyer: I have had no access to books.
Q: Your contention is that what is not generally prohibited is allowed.
O’Dwyer: Yes.
Even though no direct message came from Lahore (at least, there is none on record), it could be that Dyer, quite presumptuously, took over the command. A telephonic message was sent on 11 April at 10.30 a.m. (by railway telephone) from the Private Secretary, Lahore, to the Commissioner, Amritsar:
Please instruct Officer Commanding Troops, Amritsar, to report situation to General Officer Commanding, Jullundur, and repeat to General Officer Commanding, Lahore Cantonments.
While the Officer Commanding had been asked to report the situation to Dyer, he might have taken it as a signal that he had been asked to go to Amritsar. However, some authors, both British and Indian, claim that there was a premeditated plan to send Dyer to Amritsar. They say that O’Dwyer had spoken to Dyer prior to the massacre, and that is how it was planned.
O’Dwyer had always maintained that a senior official in the Viceroy’s office had told him ‘they should make an example.’ This is on record. But according to Terence Blackburn:
O’Dwyer noted the instruction carefully in his diary. He then called a meeting with the top British military and civil officials at Government House in Lahore, to decide on a course of action. The meeting was unofficial and no notes were taken. At the meeting, Brigadier General Dyer was verbally instructed ‘to teach Indians the lesson that revolution was a dangerous game’ and to avenge the deaths of the five English civilians.8
Could this be true? There is no reference to it in Dyer’s own accounts—unless a decision was also taken that he should not speak about it. On the other hand, if he had received instructions from O’Dwyer it would explain Dyer’s own sudden appearance on the scene despite the fact that Morgan had already been sent to take over from MacDonald. It would also explain why no one asked any questions about who had asked him to come; certainly, O’Dwyer, when questioned by the Hunter Committee, had no answers. It would also explain how Smith already knew on 11 April that Dyer was coming to the city.
However, Dyer’s own statement on 25 August 1919 (from Brigadier General REH Dyer, CB, Commanding 45th Brigade, to the General Staff, 16th Division) puts a slightly different spin on events, making it difficult to prove if a telegram was sent to summon him to Amritsar. He wrote, ‘All communication between Amritsar and Jullundur were interrupted at 4.0 P.M. on the 10th, but at 8.0 p.m. we got a wire through to Amritsar by the Railway telegraph, in a roundabout way, telling Amritsar that troops were coming. At about 2.0 P.M. on the 11th April I received a telegram from the 16th Division (Lahore) telling me to proceed to Amritsar and take charge of the situation if the situation at Jullundur permitted it.’ He met the Commissioner at Jullundur and left as soon as he could, arriving in Amritsar at nine in the night. He held his first meeting inside a railway carriage at the Amritsar railway station which had become a temporary headquarter for the civil and military authorities.9
Almost immediately upon arrival, Dyer took charge of the situation. There were 1,185 troops in Amritsar by then and all were reporting to him. He co-opted Morgan to work with him.
At just past midnight, Dyer went into the city with around 50 troops, along with Irving and Massey. Ashraf Khan, the Indian Inspector of Police for the city, had a conference with them about the arrangements for 12 April. Khan fed the fears of the others by claiming that villagers were gathering from surrounding areas to drive out the British, creating a ‘danda fauj’. As Indians had no weapons, sticks were commonly used. And while this literally meant ‘army with sticks’ to make it appear more ferocious perhaps, it was commonly known as ‘bludgeon army’ or ‘danda fauj’.
At around 2 a.m., Dyer ordered that the electricity be cut off. (This has already been mentioned in detail before but no reason was given for the action.) We can only assume he needed to show the population of Amritsar that he had arrived and things would be different from now on.
The next morning, Dyer shifted camp from the railway station to the much grander milieu of Ram Bagh, where the nineteenth-century summer palace of Maharaja Ranjit Singh was located. He set about placing pickets to ensure that people could not enter the city without being checked. Commissioner Kitchin and Deputy Inspector General Donald had again driven down from Lahore and heard rumours about an attack from the Manjha area on Amritsar. Though nothing happened en route, Kitchin was perhaps still
hoping for revenge for the killings of the five Europeans. He stated: ‘I was advised on the road that the trouble would go further unless Amritsar riots were stopped at once.’10
He complained that (despite the severe reprisals of 10 April) the people of Amritsar did not show their ‘good disposition towards us. . .We could get no information, and they would give us no assistance.’ According to him, it was only after martial law was imposed de facto with the arrival of Dyer that the attitude of the people changed and they became more cooperative. Now the British wanted an example to be made, which would terrorise the people in Punjab in general. As the news of Gandhi’s arrest as well as the detention of Kitchlew and Satya Pal spread, uprisings were taking place all over. And it was only after the killings at Jallianwala Bagh that Kitchin felt ‘the troubles were over’.
As he said during his cross-examination by C.H. Setalvad:
Q: So I take your view to be that it was necessary to do something on a grand scale to strike terror into the minds of the people, was that the idea?
A: Well, with some modifications of epithets, yes. . .the military situation was so serious that an example was necessary?
Q: The military situation, not in Amritsar itself, but in the surrounding parts?
A: In the surrounding parts and in the Punjab generally.11
Well briefed by the time of enquiry about all the various disorders taking place, Dyer would quote some of these, including the purported rising in Manjha, in his own defence later. O’Dwyer did not need to be present to urge Dyer to take strong steps as everyone was encouraging him to act against an invisible (and possibly make-believe) threat of rebellion.
Amritsar was peaceful, even according to the official messages that were being sent to Lahore, for instance: ‘Troops have gone into the city to occupy and make arrests. General Dyer from Jullundur commanding. No news yet. Village peaceful. Headquarters now Rambagh. Message can be sent from station.’
Because of the aircraft hovering over Amritsar on 12 April, Dyer was able to find out that a crowd was gathering at Sultanwind Gate and headed there. He was out on the streets with 120 British and 310 Indian troops along with two armoured cars.